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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Cosme Oidac appeals the District Court’s imposition of a 24-month sentence for 
having violated the terms of his supervised release.  Oidac contends that his due process 
rights were violated by the District Court’s delay in holding the revocation hearing, and 
that the sentence was based on a factual error and thus procedurally unreasonable.  We 
will affirm. 
I. 
On February 5, 1992, Oidac was indicted for offenses related to cocaine 
trafficking, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 860(a).  In proceedings 
before the Honorable Judge Jan DuBois, Oidac pled guilty and was sentenced to 81 
months in prison and 5 years of supervised release.  The terms of the supervised release 
prohibited Oidac from (a) committing a federal, state, or local crime; (b) using any 
unlawful narcotics; and (c) associating with persons engaged in criminal activity.  Oidac 
served the full 81-month sentence, and on April 13, 1998, was released. 
In October and December of 1998, Oidac failed three urine tests.  Three of the 
tests detected marijuana, and two detected cocaine.  In addition to using drugs, Oidac 
became involved with a criminal conspiracy to sell cocaine, for which he was arrested on 
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January 17, 1999.   On February 24, 1999, the U.S. Probation Office filed a petition with 
Judge DuBois to revoke Oidac’s supervised release.  The petition alleged that Oidac 
violated the terms of his release by (a) committing a crime, (b) failing the urine tests, and 
(c) knowingly associating with individuals engaged in a criminal conspiracy.  On March 
4, 1999, Judge DuBois ordered that a warrant be lodged as a detainer at the correctional 
facility where Oidac was located. 
In December 1999, after a two-week trial before the Honorable Judge Anita 
Brody, a jury convicted Oidac on one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of using a communication device in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).  It was not until 2004, 
however, that Oidac was sentenced.  On March 11, 2004, Judge Brody sentenced Oidac 
to 360 months in prison.  As the government notes in its brief, the more than four-year 
gap between Oidac’s conviction and sentence was “caused in part by a litany of [Oidac]-
initiated pro se motions, requests to continue sentencing dates, and disagreements with 
court-appointed attorneys.”  Gov’t Br. at 9. 
On March 17, 2005, we affirmed Oidac’s conviction but remanded the sentence 
for sentencing proceedings consistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 2005).  Pursuant to our remand, Judge 
Brody conducted resentencing proceedings that resulted in Oidac’s sentence being 
reduced from 360 to 298 months.  On April 16, 2007, we affirmed this sentence.  United 
States v. Ordaz, 227 F. Appx. 170, 172 (3d Cir. 2007).  After the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on October 1, 2007, Oidac commenced habeas proceedings in which he 
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collaterally attacked both the sentence and conviction.  These habeas claims were denied 
on February 28, 2011.  Three months later, on May 24, 2011, Judge DuBois held a 
revocation hearing to determine if Oidac had violated the terms of his release.  At the 
hearing, Oidac argued that he had been wrongfully convicted of the 1999 drug charges.  
He admitted, however, to the legal fact of the conviction and admitted that the 1998 urine 
tests were accurate. 
At the end of his allocution, Oidac asked Judge DuBois, “Isn’t there some kind of 
limitation from ‘99 to this point, because I have been asking to be brought before you 
from 2004 and I have never been brought over.”  App. at 53.  Judge DuBois responded:  
The answer to the question about bringing you before me on the petition for 
supervised release is basically that until your conviction, you had not violated that 
provision of supervised release.  So you had to be convicted by the jury.  But once 
that happened and you began to file appeals, the Government is permitted to delay 
in having this hearing as they did.  There’s nothing improper about that.  It matters 
not that this hearing is held in 2011 as opposed to a time shortly after your 
conviction on December 23, 1999.   
 
Id. at 53–54.   
After Oidac completed his allocution, Oidac’s attorney argued that imposing 
additional incarceration would be unnecessary and duplicative in light of Judge Brody’s 
sentence.  In response, Judge DuBois asked: “How does that address the purpose of 
sentencing for a violation of supervised release, which is incremental punishment?  Right 
now, he was sentenc[ed] as though he were not under supervision at the time he 
committed the crimes charged in the Brody case.”  Id. at 56.  Oidac’s attorney replied 
that, although he was not present at the sentencing hearing,  he was “certain” Oidac’s 
supervised release violation had been considered.   
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Following this exchange, Judge DuBois imposed a below-Guideline1
In his timely appeal, Oidac challenges Judge DuBois’s sentence on two grounds.  
First, he argues that the 12-year delay between his violation of supervised release and the 
revocation hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution as well as 
Rule 31.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 sentence of 
24 months, to be served consecutively to the 298-month sentence imposed by Judge 
Brody.   In justifying this sentence, Judge DuBois stressed the need for “incremental 
punishment” and noted again his understanding that Judge Brody had not given “any 
consideration . . . to the fact” that Oidac was under supervised release at the time he 
committed the offense.  Id. at 62.   
2
II.
   Second, he argues that Judge 
DuBois committed procedural error by basing the sentence on an allegedly erroneous 
fact: that Judge Brody had not given “any consideration” to his violation of supervised 
release.   
3
We exercise plenary review over alleged violations of the Constitution and Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 677 (3d Cir. 
2009); United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1397 (3d Cir. 1994).  Criminal sentences, 
 
                                              
1 As set forth by the Guidelines revocation table at U.S.S.C. § 7B1.4, the undisputed 
sentencing range was 46 to 57 months. 
2 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2) (“Unless waived by the person, the court must hold the 
revocation hearing within a reasonable time in the district having jurisdiction.”). 
3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 
3583(e).  We have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 3742. 
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by contrast, are reviewed for reasonableness.4
III.  
   Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007).  A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if it is based on a clear factual error.  
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).   
A. Due Process Claim5
Hearings to revoke supervised release, like hearings to revoke parole, are not 
criminal prosecutions.  United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1994).   Accordingly, the “full panoply 
of rights” that attach during a criminal trial, including the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of a “speedy trial,” do not attach to revocation proceedings.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).  Revocation proceedings do infringe on conditional liberty 
interests, however, and thereby trigger some, albeit limited, protections under the Due 
Process Clause.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484; Tippens, 39 F.3d at 90; see also Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (stating that due process in the revocation context “is 
not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility, and 
economy must always be sacrificed”).   
 
One due process right triggered by revocation proceedings is the right to have the 
revocation hearing within a “reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.”  
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488.  This right has been codified in Rule 32.1 of the Federal 
                                              
4 The government argues that Oidac did not preserve any of the claims presented in this 
appeal, and therefore that our review should be limited to plain error.  Because this 
argument has no bearing on the outcome of this case, we will not address it here.  
5 Since Oidac’s statutory claim under Rule 32.1 is essentially the same as his due process 
claim, our due process analysis is sufficient to resolve both claims.    
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Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that courts “must hold the revocation 
hearing within a reasonable time.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2).  In interpreting this right, 
courts look to the “somewhat analogous context of the Sixth Amendment right to speedy 
trial.”6
Factors (1) and (2): Length of, and Reason for, the Delay 
  United States v. Rasmussen, 881 F.2d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United 
States v. Companion, 545 F.2d 308, 311 (2d Cir. 1976)).  Speedy trial claims under the 
Sixth Amendment are assessed by weighing the following factors: (1) length of the delay, 
(2) reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice.  
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–32 (1972). 
Here, the factor that weighs most strongly in Oidac’s favor is the length of delay.  
As Oidac notes, “[c]ourts have been seriously troubled by delays in revocation 
proceedings of far shorter than 12 years.”7
                                              
6 Due to the “significant differences” in the constitutional import of delays in the pre-trial 
and post-conviction contexts, Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 1994), “Speedy 
Trial Clause authority should not be applied in revocation proceedings as if it were 
directly controlling.”  Santana, 526 F.3d at 1261.   
  Nevertheless, a long delay is not sufficient by 
itself to establish a Due Process violation if the other Barker factors do not weigh in the 
petitioner’s favor.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (“We regard none of the four factors . . .  
as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of 
speedy trial.”).  Although we are troubled by the absence of a clear reason to justify delay 
7 In Rasmussen, for example, the Seventh Circuit noted that a 13-month delay in holding 
a revocation hearing “requires that our scrutiny of the remaining factors be a demanding 
one.”  881 F.3d at 398. 
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during the last seven of the twelve years at issue,8
Factor 3: Oidac’s Assertion of His Right 
 the remaining factors weigh in favor of 
the government.  
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he defendant's assertion of his speedy trial 
right . . . is entitled to strong evidentiary weight,” and that “failure to assert the right will 
make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.”  Id. at 531–
32.  Here, there is scant evidence that Oidac asserted his right to a reasonably prompt 
hearing.  The only evidence Oidac cites is his statement to Judge DuBois at the 
revocation hearing that “I have been asking to be brought before you from 2004 and I 
have never been brought over.”  Oidac argues that, if he was not telling the truth about 
these prior requests, Judge DuBois or the government would have corrected him at the 
hearing, and thus, “[t]he judge’s and prosecutor’s silence” provided “independent support 
for the veracity” of his account.  Reply Br. at 4–5.  This argument strains credulity.  As 
the government points out, Oidac was no stranger to filing written pro se requests 
throughout the entirety of his proceedings before Judge Brody.  The absence of docket 
entries and written requests to Judge DuBois suggests none were made here.  Although 
Oidac’s counsel speculates that the lack of documentation could be the result of Oidac’s 
                                              
8 We refer here to the seven years following Judge Brody’s imposition of sentence in 
March 2004.  Cf. United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t was 
reasonable for the District Court to wait for the adjudication of the state court charges 
before proceeding with the revocation hearing.”).  Even if the government is correct that 
Oidac substantially contributed to this seven-year delay through excessive pro se filings 
challenging his conviction and sentence, any such pro se filings would not have 
prevented the District Court from holding a revocation hearing.  
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case file being destroyed, neither Oidac’s counsel nor Oidac himself actually assert that 
written requests were filed.   
Factor 4: Prejudice 
Irrespective of how we weigh the aforementioned factors, Oidac’s due process 
claim must ultimately fail because the delay did not prejudice him.  The Supreme Court 
has identified three ways that persons can be actually prejudiced by violations of their 
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial: (1) impairment of their ability to contest the 
charges; (2) infringement of their liberty interest against unnecessary incarceration; and 
(3) infliction of mental anxiety by being kept in legal limbo.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.  
None of these interests is implicated here. 
First, there is no evidence to show that the delay prejudiced Oidac’s ability to 
contest the charges.  See United States v. Throneburg, 87 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]he defendant's due process concerns about delay come into play only when the delay 
has prejudiced the defendant's ability to contest the validity of the revocation.”).  Indeed, 
Oidac readily admits he was convicted of a crime that was upheld on appeal and that he 
violated the terms of his supervised release by using cocaine and marijuana.   
Second, the revocation proceeding did not infringe on Oidac’s liberty interest 
against excessive incarceration because he was in custody as a result of his drug 
conviction, not the revocation warrant.  This is critical because, in the revocation context, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that “when a parolee’s custody derives from another 
conviction rather than from a parole violator warrant, the consequent liberty loss 
‘attendant upon parole revocation’ . . . is not yet triggered.”  United States v. Scott, 850 
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F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1976)).  
In the revocation context, therefore, we must consider  “the reason why the probationer 
was in custody.”  Rasmussen, 881 F.2d at 398 (emphasis added); see also United States v. 
Chaklader, 987 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding “no constitutional duty to provide 
petitioner an adversary parole hearing until he is taken into custody as a parole violator”).  
Since Oidac never spent a single day in custody as a result of his supervised release 
violation, his interest against unnecessary incarceration had not been triggered prior to 
the revocation hearing. 
Third, although Oidac’s attorney talks in general, hypothetical terms about the 
anxiety that Oidac may have experienced as a result of being kept in limbo, we have 
previously stated that “only unusual or specific problems of personal prejudice will 
satisfy the Barker test.”  Heiser, 15 F.3d at 305.  Since Oidac has produced no evidence 
of any “unusual or specific” manifestations of anxiety, this form of prejudice clearly does 
not apply. 
Even if actual prejudice cannot be demonstrated, Oidac argues that the delay was 
so long that prejudice should be presumed.  See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 
655 (1992) (“[A]ffirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every 
speedy trial claim.”).  Oidac’s argument, however, is unconvincing.  While courts have 
presumed prejudice from lengthy delays in the Sixth Amendment context, e.g., Doggett, 
505 U.S. at 655–56; Battis, 589 F.3d at 683, no federal court has ever presumed prejudice 
from delays in revocation hearings.  See, e.g., Santana, 526 F.3d at 1261 (“[W]e apply 
our ordinary test in supervised release revocation cases and search for actual prejudice.”).  
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Although this Court has “not foreclose[d] entirely the possibility that a situation may 
arise where the court may presume prejudice in a post-conviction delay context,” Heiser, 
15 F.3d at 304, the compelling circumstances that would justify such a presumption are 
not present here.  As noted above, Oidac never spent a single day in prison as a result of 
the revocation warrant;9 he admits he violated the terms of his supervised release; he can 
point to no convincing scenario by which the delay may have compromised his ability to 
obtain leniency;10
B. Procedural Error Claim 
 and there is no evidence, other than Oidac’s self-serving, last-minute 
testimony, that he ever asserted his right to a speedier proceeding.  We are not prepared 
to presume prejudice based on these facts. 
We turn now to Oidac’s argument that the District Court committed procedural 
error in crafting the sentence.  A district court commits procedural error when it bases the 
sentence on “clearly erroneous facts.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  A factual finding “is clearly 
erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire 
                                              
9 Although Oidac notes that the detainer may have impacted his rights and security 
classification as a prisoner, the Supreme Court has indicated that such an effect does not 
necessarily trigger constitutional scrutiny.  See Moody, 429 U.S. at 88 n.9 (“We have 
rejected the notion that every state action carrying adverse consequences for prison 
inmates automatically activates a due process right.”).   
10 Oidac’s counsel sets forth the following scenarios: “Perhaps Mr. [Oidac], had he not 
already been locked away for 12 years, would still have been close enough with a free 
friend or relative to have someone come to court to ask for lenience on his behalf.  
Perhaps Mr. [Oidac] would have made a more favorable impression himself had he not 
been made to endure a bitter seven years waiting to be heard, or had he displayed the 
energy of a younger man.  Perhaps he could have been represented by the attorney who 
handled the original 1992 prosecution, who might have better known what chord to strike 
with the judge.”  Br. at 23.   
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evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  
United States v. Lopez, 650 F.3d 952, 966 (3d Cir. 2011).   
Here, Oidac argues that Judge DuBois committed procedural error by relying on 
“the clearly erroneous ‘fact’ that [Oidac’s] status as a supervised releasee had no impact 
on the sentence imposed by Judge Brody.”  Br. at 26.  The government counters by 
arguing that Judge DuBois’s assertion that Judge Brody had not given “any 
consideration” to Oidac’s releasee status was not an erroneous statement of fact, but a 
correct statement of law.  According to the government, sentencing judges consider 
violations of supervised release in order to calculate a defendant’s criminal history, per 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), while revocation hearing judges consider violations to sanction a 
releasee for his “breach” of the court’s “trust,” per U.S.S.G. § 7 Pt. A.  The government 
asks us, therefore, to read Judge DuBois’s statement as a correct observation that Judge 
Brody had not considered the need to sanction Oidac for breaching the court’s trust.  
While the government’s argument is a plausible one, Judge DuBois’s statement can be 
read as an assertion of fact, and we will therefore assess it for its factual accuracy.   
According to Oidac, the record is clear that Judge Brody considered his supervised 
release violation.  Oidac cites the following evidence to support this assertion: (1) the 
Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) upon which Judge Brody relied had assigned two points to 
Oidac’s criminal history score, per U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), for having committed the 
offense while on supervised release; (2) the prosecutor referenced the supervised release 
violation in its sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing; (3) Judge Brody 




First, while the prosecutor mentioned Oidac’s supervised release violation, Judge 
Brody did not.  Although Judge Brody mentioned that Oidac had engaged in drug activity 
“two days after being released from prison,” this was part of a drug attribution analysis 
for which Oidac’s release violation was irrelevant.  Second, although the PSR assigned 
two points for Oidac’s violation, this had no bearing on Oidac’s criminal history 
category.  Indeed, because of his lengthy criminal history, Oidac’s criminal history score 
would have qualified as a Category VI on the Guidelines’ chart even if the Probation 
Office had not assigned any points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d).  Nor is it dispositive that 
Judge Brody emphasized Oidac’s criminal history as a justification for the sentence.  In 
her comments, Judge Brody referenced Oidac’s location “on the criminal history chart” 
as the factor of importance, not the number of criminal history points he happened to 
have.  App. at 133 (emphasis added).  Based on the record before us, therefore, there is 
nothing to show that Judge Brody crafted her sentence based on a consideration of 
Oidac’s violation of supervised release, and nothing in her reasoning suggests the 
sentence would have been different had Oidac not been on supervised release.  
Accordingly, Judge DuBois did not impose a sentence based on a clear factual error.   
; and (4) Judge Brody emphasized Oidac’s criminal history as a key 
consideration justifying the sentence.  For the reasons that follow, we disagree with 
Oidac’s assessment of this evidence.  
IV. 
                                              
11 App at 110. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
sentence.  
